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As he prepares to fly to Venus at the start of his adventures in 1950, Dan Dare, who was to 
become the greatest comic book hero of post-war Britain, enters a Whitehall-of-the-future 
dominated by an immense towering statue of a certain John Strachey. Why the honor? 
Strachey had been a senior member of the 1945 Labor government. But his greatest claim to 
popular fame (or infamy) was The Groundnuts Scheme, a dream which spoke to the spirit of 
the times. It was born in Strachey's mind when, as a senior wartime RAF Staff Officer, he 
had seen the great allied armada sailing through the Straits of Gibraltar in November 1942 
carrying the British and American Armies and their vast quantities of tanks, vehicles, 
munitions and supplies, to the shores of North Africa for the Operation Torch 
Landings.  Strachey later wrote of how the spectacle inspired him with the thought that the 
course of history might again be changed if a second such armada was to sail to the shores of 
Africa, but this time carrying mighty shipments of tractors, ploughshares, fertilizers and 
armies of engineers and agricultural experts.  It would thereby - in the most literal sense - 
plant the seeds of a huge productive potential, which might sustain a continuing independent 
world role for Britain. The background assumption - shortly unmasked as a delusion - that 
European rule would remain in Africa for generations to come - was unrelentingly shared on 
the mainland of Europe.  Yet ironically it was such fantasies, whether dressed up by the 
traditional imperialist Right under the slogan of ‘the Third British Empire’ or projected in 
progressive guise by Strachey as laying the geopolitical foundations for an International 
Socialist Commonwealth that contributed to keeping Britain aloof from the emerging 
European integration project.  Meanwhile, those engaged in that project hoped to implement 
the same dream, with or without Britain: a dream for which the shorthand expression 
Eurafrica came into being - pooling sovereignty in Europe and pooling colonial 
administration in Africa as two sides of the same coin (Hansen and Jonsson, 2013, 2015). 
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Strachey’s dream never came to be. Groundnuts proved to be a fiasco and Eurafrica was 
forgotten. With decolonization and the cold war, Europeans redirected their energy within. 
And while the modern nation-state versions of the erstwhile imperial metropoles remained 
shaped by their colonial pasts, Europe in its incarnation as the EEC and later the EU, sought 
to capitalize on the myth of its virgin birth and in the process redefine itself as a post-imperial 
peace project: post-imperial within, as no longer shall big European states bully smaller states 
into submission; post-imperial without, as no longer shall Europe impose its will and whims 
onto the rest of the world. The ‘post’ here would be about transcending the past and 
committing once and for all to the spirit and letter of multilateralism. 
Yet polities have a knack for not following the best laid plans. Empires may ebb and flow 
but imperial patterns are never far from the surface of the international order. Arguably, the 
Cold War offered a post-colonial re-ordering around the confrontation of two modern 
empires, while the post-cold war reawakened the mindset and practices of older empires, not 
least the universalizing impulse in Europe. In the process, and as discussed in this book, some 
of these old reflexes have come back to the fore on the European stage, at first incrementally, 
and then intensely with the Eurocrisis. If we are far from the ‘spiritual unity’ proclaimed 
behind the post-war drive to create ‘Eurafrica’ as a third geopolitical pole between U.S. and 
Soviet ambitions, we still must ask whether colonialism is not part of Europe’s DNA (Behr, 
2007, Nicolaidis et al, 2014). 
To be sure, the relevance of the trope of ‘empire’ to the twenty-first century is not all or 
even mostly due to the old continent. Instead, and with 9/11, “Empires that once seemed to 
belong in one of history’s many dustbins—an outmoded form of politics, to be studied only 
through traces left across the shattered landscapes of their former subject peoples,” have 
come to seem contentious, interesting, highly topical, and perhaps, not all bad (Pagden 2006). 
From its policing of the free world during the Cold War, to the drive to combat militant 
Islamist terrorism, the United States resurrected the spectre of imperialism for some, 
rehabilitating the imperial promise of order for others.1 Wherever one stands vis-à-vis the 
renewed salience of empire, it is clear that Europe has played the side-kick in this new 
version of imperialism through conquest and battle.  
Yet the story of Europe’s imperial leanings is also more than derivative of evolving 
Western interventionism. ‘Empire,’ for better or worse, has become a watchword in Europe’s 
dealings with its close or far away neighbors, as well as in its relations with former colonies, 
from the resurrection of the lens of 19th century standards of civilisation to denunciations of 
‘neo-colonialism.’2 But the eurocrisis also seems to have brought the colonial trope closer to 
home. Here then we find another meaning of ‘post’-imperial – this time post as reproduction 
of prior patterns recycled under a new discourse. Hence, the notion of ‘post’ when affixed to 
the ‘imperial’ or the ‘colonial’ (terms which we will use interchangeably) answers to two 
rather different definitions: the first ‘post’ as in dealing with and transcending Europe’s 
colonial past; the second ‘post’ as in reproducing its imperial legacy whether or not the 
pattern is denied or celebrated. 
We can perhaps better understand the relationship between these two readings by 
recalling Behr’s contribution to this volume in which, via a genealogy of its Latin 
significations, we recognize that ‘empire’ itself is a site of polysemy. Starting with John 
Darwin’s definition of imperialism “as the sustained effort to assimilate a country or region 
to the political, economic or cultural system of another power” we can posit that empires are 
always one way or another characterised by centre-periphery relations whereby through more 
or less coercive inducements, the centre seeks to govern the periphery ‘at a distance’ 
following Hartmut Behr’s apt characterization.  But in doing so, there is always a gradation 
between different expressions of the imperial from material to ideational. At one end of the 
spectrum, the imperial is a mode of governance, a description of manifest actions aimed at 
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ensuring the security and prosperity of metropoles though some combination of co-option 
and coercion of their more or less loosely interconnected peripheries. At the other end of the 
spectrum, imperial is a state of mind, a sensibility inculcated by habits of imperial 
governance to be sure – and hence most often and most prominently encountered in 
conjunction with imperial might - but also often outlasting the very imperial machineries by 
which imperial mindsets were initially engendered.  
This capacity of imperialistic sensibilities to outlive empire recalls the Gramscian notion 
of hegemony later appropriated by the likes of Foucault, Said, Babha, and Chakrabarty in 
their readings of the enduring power of dominant groups to “shape conceptions of the 
normal”  as Manners has it, to the exclusion or detriment of others (Diez 2013, 194). Thus, 
while the imperial mindset is a function of colonialism, it can continue to reverberate long 
after the demise of empire. After all, imperial governance is about management of security, 
economic, and political affairs, whereas imperial sensitivities, though engendered by imperial 
management, become woven into the woof of individual and collective psychologies, 
memories, aspirations, and fears. These have a life of their own and can be affected by 
multiple factors that are dissonant with the ‘real world’ balance of power (e.g. denial, 
insecurity, egoism, and indeed concrete factors like an insulated geography or full treasury). 
In the case of Europe, the enduring resonance of the imperial is of course also a function of 
the fact that European decline is relative not absolute. After all, and in no small measure due 
to capital accumulated as a result of colonialism, European countries enjoy levels of 
development and welfare as well as an embedded-ness in international institutions that ensure 
enduring if diminished influence in international affairs.  
Crucially, this persistence of imperial capacities and logics is a result of the fact that 
Europeans’ historical successes were enabled by resources and labour appropriated from the 
world ‘without.’  This is a basic historical fact documented in a flourishing body of 
interdisciplinary scholarship.3 Yet, narratives of the EU’s foundation and purpose have been 
remarkably resistant to acknowledging this co-constitution of the internal and the external. 
Our argument in this chapter is predicated on this recognition, for any understanding of 
Europe’s post-imperial condition must grapple with the historical reality that imperialism - 
whether it is to be transcended or reproduced - was a two-way street. Thus, while one can 
analytically disaggregate between internal and external manifestations of the post-imperial 
condition, it is necessary to remain cognizant of their interconnection. 
In this chapter, we start with the assumption that while the discussion as to whether or to 
what extent the EU ought to be characterised as ‘empire’ is a fruitful and productive one, we 
can take some of the axioms developed in this book as given (see also inter alia Zielonka, 
2006).  We argue first that Europe as embodied in today’s EU is best characterised by its 
post-imperial condition, that is, the tension between its aspiration to transcend or overcome 
its imperial legacies on one hand, and its propensity to reproduce and project these legacies 
on the other; and second that in doing so, scholars need to make more explicit the relationship 
between internal and external imperial patterns. On both these counts, our ambition is to 
propose a way of framing the question that occupies the editors and contributors to this 
volume rather than offer a satisfactory treatment thereof.  We ask how the EU has dealt with 
its post-imperial condition over time, and what normative guidelines could help it do so 
better. Revisiting our recent argument on the analogy between the 19th-century standard of 
civilization and the EU’s relations with the rest of the world, we suggest that the EU’s 
narratives and modes of actions today have only partially succeeded in dealing with its 
hegemonic hangover (Nicolaidis 2014).4 We do not know whether internal or external 
imperial patterns reinforce or mitigate each other. Thus, the definitive reconfiguration of 
international order away from Europe paradoxically may lead to the reassertion of imperial 
tendencies internally, as the great powers within Europe retrench and regroup. By the same 
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token, its ability in a number of arenas to transcend imperial habits internally can have 
ramifications for the EU’s engagement of its neighbours and the broader world.  
We first defend the idea that the EU has long embarked on a post-imperial project that is 
indeed grounded on a commitment to non-domination internally as well as externally. 
Second, we show that this project has in part failed both within and without, because old 
habits die hard, and because of evolving internal and external conjectural factors. Finally, we 
ask how the EU may best deal with its post-imperial condition – namely pursue a 
“decentering agenda” – by focusing on the cases of Turkey and Ukraine.   
‘Post’ as Transcendence: Non Domination and Equality 	  
In some ways, today’s EU project can still be defined against an imperialism it sought to 
escape more than half a century ago. At one level, this has to do with the continent itself, a 
continent that has hovered for two millennia between various forms of fragmentation and 
(imperial) union from Rome to Byzantine, Holy Roman to Soviet, Habsburg to Ottoman and 
eventually to Nazi Europe. A second imperial strand is located ‘beyond the seas’, as some 
would say, with Europeans’ ‘compulsive colonialism’ driven as Juan Rossi pithily puts it, by 
the ‘endemic illness’ of a minuscule continent’s pathological need to expand (Rossi 2015). 
Clearly, however, these two ancestral godparents were not represented equally at the side of 
the EU cradle: the former would be transcended, the latter all but denied.  Faced with these 
various modes of remembering and forgetting, scholars can be forgiven when they disagree 
on the referent for ‘Europe’s Empires’ (Marks, 2012 vs Hansen and Jonsson 2013). What 
matters for our purposes is how the two are related. 
The mainstream reading of the birth of the EU is that of a continental anti-hegemonic 
project, a rejection of previous hegemonic attempts at unification which have characterized 
the aftermath of Europe’s wars for a millennium (Lacroix and Nicolaidis, 2010). Yet, as Jan 
Zielonka, Gary Marks and others have cogently argued, this would entail reproducing 
elements of former European Empires – including above all the Holy Roman variant from the 
late medieval to the late Baroque period when the translatio imperii had all but disappeared 
in favour of distributed sovereignty. In post-World War II Europe, peace would require not 
only the taming of nationalism in general, with Europe’s peoples giving up on self-realisation 
through ‘othering’ and sharing sovereignty instead, but also a more concrete set of 
mechanisms to contain the historical appetite for power on the part of the big states 
(Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2005). The people of France or Germany qua states would be 
constrained by the new institutional arrangements making it impossible to subjugate other 
countries or the continent as a whole. And EU institutions would ensure that even as of when 
the threat of war would recede, the norm of non-domination among peoples would remain.  
The EU therefore can be seen as creating an institutionalized balance of power among 
states to ensure non-subordination between them. Coalitions and negotiations have replaced 
alliances and bandwagoning to entrench the balance in a web of institutionalised distribution 
of roles and rules of behaviour (e.g. rotating presidency of the Council, disproportionate 
representation and vote in the Commission, Parliament and Council).  And as the stakes for 
Europe changed from the survival of states to the autonomy of its peoples, shifting our 
analytical prism from the major key of IR to the minor key of democratic theory, the 
imperative of inter-state non domination is translated into its republican requisite to ban the 
exercise of arbitrary power of one person against another (Pettit 1997). The EU, with its 
referenda, elections and polls sets up a dynamic of peoples checking peoples as it were, 
predicated on the sense on the part of its citizens that the common project assumes their 
equality irrespective of the size and power of their member state of origin.  
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In theory then, as well as in juridical practice, the EC-EU project set into motion a 
fundamental transformation from an imperial to an federal genus, grounded on formal 
equality between states and the politics of emulation; this meant in turn trading in the 
imperial centre seeking to govern other Europeans ‘at a distance’ for federal shared 
governance or governing ‘together.’  
It is this transformation and its translation in political and democratic terms that the 
nascent literature on demoi-cratic theory seeks to capture building on the broader literature on 
European integration while emphasizing the technologies of pluralism embedded therin.5 
Accordingly, the EU is a flawed but nevertheless tentative demoi-cracy in the making, i.e. a 
union of peoples who govern together but not as one. These people have sought to refine 
what Joseph Weiler (2001) called constitutional tolerance through the co-mingling of their 
democratic orders by choice, a choice that needs to be seen as ultimately reversible through 
permissible exit. Admittedly, we encounter here the elasticity of the notion of ‘Empire’. With 
this version of the EU, we are far from classic Empires in a polity where the question of final 
authority is still left open and heterarchy reigns such that the EU is a ‘networks of elements in 
which each element shares the same horizontal position of power and authority’ (Halberstram 
2009). In this regard, as noted above, we are very close to the kind of neo-medieval form of 
empire discussed by Jan Zielonka, with diffuse and overlapping authority. And yet, the 
analogy is incomplete at best simply because empires pre-dated the democratic age. The EU 
has had to develop a political form that combines that of multi-centric Empire (or empire 
without domination) with democratic anchoring in its separate and autonomous states. It may 
be no surprise that it has not quite succeeded in doing so - a point to which we come back.  
The second part of the story of the EU’s birth and growth under the shadow of its past is 
more invisible yet critical: the ways the ‘outside,’ namely the overseas colonial inheritance, 
contributed to the construction of the ‘inside’ and vice versa. Confronting the second legacy, 
we suggest, has been subordinated to the first, and yet the efficacy of EU agency in the world 
depends upon its recognition. The self-appointment of the EU as a ‘credible force for good’ 
in international relations, as Solana, its first foreign policy representative once declared, 
depends upon a core axiom: the need for consistency between the two sides of the coin. 
While the creation of the EC was in part about forgetting the colonial past of these member 
states and more generally abstaining from the global stage, this imperative for consistency 
must permeate its progressive return to this very stage since the 1970s and more forcefully 
with the end of the cold war. 
Indeed, the standard story of the reinvention of Europe as a normative project from the 
earliest days of the EC to its progressive assertion as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power in the 
last two decades, rested on what the EU was trying to do inside: sticking to its now localized 
ambition to civilise Europe rather than the world. After a civil war exported to the world, 
unilateral universalism could no longer be sold as benign whether as a justificatory discourse 
for colonialism or as a guide for external action after decolonisation (Nicolaidis 2015). 
Instead the EU dealt with mundane issues like trade liberalisation, competition rule and 
product standards.  As a different kind of polity internally, it could be a different kind of actor 
externally: if it was to enlarge it would be ‘by invitation,’ if it was to export standards, it 
would be by persuasion. Subjugation of non-Europeans could not be part of the story. 
This self-image and the practices by which it was accompanied were underwritten by 
both the structure and the spirit of the times. After all, the pursuit of inclusive practices was 
bolstered politically and economically by United States involvement in Europe’s 
reconstruction and, above all, by its guarantee of a permissive security environment as part 
and parcel of deterrence of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Berlin crisis. This meant that 
nascent pan-European institutions did not even develop the capacity for post- or neo-imperial 
power projection in military terms. The US security vision for the region as part of its broader 
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policy of containment also necessitated coalition-building in the fight against the Warsaw 
Pact. An outcome of this for European ability to internalize difference was the co-option of 
both Greece and Turkey – on an equal footing at the beginning – through the parallel 
evolution of Marshall plan and NATO arrangements and European Economic Community 
Association Agreements etc. Tellingly, posters from the era promoting the Marshall plan, 
display the Greek and Turkish flags at the heart of a reconstructed European body politic – 
semiotics that are hard to imagine today.  
If the Marshall Plan and NATO fed the dynamic of European integration and expansion 
by allowing inclusive enlargement (the very nexus of the ‘within’ and the ‘without’) to 
become the almost sole focus of Europe’s foreign policy, they also directly enabled the EU 
(if not all its member states) to devote the lion’s share of their budgets to non-security 
concerns. The ensuing economic surplus, in turn, served European southern enlargement 
towards the new Mediterranean democracies.  If the enlargement process was reminiscent of 
imperial practices as some of us have argued (Behr 2007; Nicolaidis & Fisher Onar 2013), 
this would be redeemed by the equal status awaiting the members to be. 
Meanwhile, as decolonization – the de jure transcendence of Europe’s imperial legacy – 
unfolded across the 1960s and 1970s, a certain post-imperial sense of solidarity with the 
nascent nation-states of Africa and Asia infused youth and (left) intellectual cadres many of 
whom would go on to become national and EU-level leaders.6 In this way, affective and 
intellectual bases for a ‘decentered agenda’ transcendent of the imperial past as opposed to 
hierarchical engagement of the extra-European world were in evidence early on in the 
European project, although they were by no means the dominant key.   
By the 1990s-2000s the apparent transcendence of empire gained momentum as the EU 
took in a host of member states whose histories and sensitivities pluralized the post-imperial 
ambition. Indeed the sixteen new member states which have joined since the end of the cold-
war, not only doubled the surface of the EU but turned it into a space of many former 
colonies. As Dimitar Bechev (2014) observes, the EU now includes Malta and Cyprus which 
were British colonial possessions as recently as the early 1960s, while for many of the new 
Eastern European members the memory of imperial satellite status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
is barely more than two decades old. Radical differences between dominant historical 
legacies of imperial rule not only distinguish ‘Europe’ from ‘non-Europe’ but Europeans 
among themselves. We are not even facing an East-West divergence within the EU echoing 
the Iron curtain, since member states like Ireland and Greece have had their own experience 
with foreign domination. But eastern and southeastern Europe might have a special role to 
play when it comes to the transcendence of Europe’s imperial past in the eyes of the rest of 
the world (Davies, 1996). For, as argued by Bechev, the ‘return to Europe’ of the ‘lands 
between’ is all the more powerful insofar as they still carry the seal of the continent’s not-
too-distant imperial identities and host the relics of the pre-Soviet empires as well form the 
Habsburgs to the Ottoman, Romanov, Holy Roman, Byzantine, and Venetian imperial 
projects, among others. Indeed, ‘the region has also been the graveyard of the imperial idea 
as the original target of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination – the very principle 
which is so influential in the emergence of Third World independence movements 
challenging the dominance of European colonial powers’ (Bechev 2015). Hence, and even 
though from the outside, the EU is often as little more than its big member states, part of the 
post-imperial promise lies with its own engagement with its internal diversity and its capacity 
to offer a more polyphonic sensitivity on the global stage (Macaj and Nicolaidis 2014).  
‘Post’ as Reproduction: Europe’s Colonial Temptations 	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Yet, there was always an important twist to the mainstream story of the EU’s birth and 
development. That is that the post-imperial challenge does not stop at eschewing direct 
horizontal domination between countries.  With greater interdependence and increasingly 
centralised competences, the risk of domination has slowly reasserted itself in another guise, 
as vertical. For fear of dominance by a Napoleon, members have given up power to Brussels. 
And due to the congruence of functional and political pressures as European integration and 
enlargement unfolded over decades - and then dramatically with the eurocrisis - the three 
safeguards against neo-imperialism which characterised integration at its beginnings have 
been progressively and partially eroded: namely, that the competences thus transferred be 
circumscribed; that the central authority be collectively owned and controlled by its many 
component states; and that the strongest countries be equally bound by collective constraints. 
Certainly, these are demanding safeguards: as pre-1865 US federalists so passionately 
reminded their contemporaries, when power is transferred from the units to a new centre - 
however ‘decentralized’ this centre may be - it is always prone to capture by permanent 
majorities or otherwise tyrannical agents. And indeed, Europe today runs the risk - the old 
Kantian fear - of embracing classic federal state domination in order to escape classic 
imperial domination, drifting from the Charybdis of horizontal domination to the Scylla of 
vertical domination (Nicolaidis 2013).7 
Crucially the risk is always that one country may capture the centre and thus conflate 
horizontal and vertical domination. This is what many believe has happened with Germany’s 
role in Europe in the wake of the Eurozone crisis. But given Germany’s own inclinations, we 
cannot and should not easily brandish the imperialist bogyman. To be sure, this is not a story 
where power disappears. If the normative ideal of European demoicracy is to transcend the 
pathologies of anarchy (as the core characteristic of the international realm) but not the 
nature of anarchy as a horizontal ordering of power, the ideal calls for taming the exercise of 
power without indulging the teleological belief that power asymmetries can be abolished or 
wished away. Demoicracy is an exercise in power mitigation not denial. As theorists of the 
English school like Bull and Wright would have it, international order, i.e. peace, demands 
that we put power to work, that collective expectations be built and institutionalized to 
entrench ‘great power responsibility.’ In an order characterized by the rule of law, be it 
domestic or international, it is the arbitrary use of power that needs to be curbed not power 
per se (Walker & Palombella 2009, Nicolaidis and Kleinfeld, 2012). This is all the more true 
in a proto-demoicratic EU, which encompasses countries with great asymmetries in their 
wealth and demographics. This is not a realm of absolutes and power cannot be wished away. 
The idea was simple and powerful: with power comes responsibility rather than domination. 
The answer remains as always: how is this disproportionate power exercised? 
One of the great lessons of the eurocrisis is that national democracies interacting under 
conditions of interdependence tread a fine line between the legitimate forging of shared 
commitments to keep the common show on the road and the arbitrary use of centralised 
powers to impose duties and obligations and thus prescribe the rules of cooperation the 
critical difference is what we can term the single standpoint (Bohman 2007 and 2008). That 
single standpoint can be national, ideological, technocratic or some combination thereof.  
Indeed it has long been clear that freedom as non-domination was far from embedded in the 
political culture of some of the larger Member States, often subject to a pervasive Gulliver 
syndrome (Magnette and Nicolaidis 2005). Many in France in particular never quite gave up 
on the neo-imperial dream of the EU as France-writ-large. But the eurocrisis has magnified 
this pathology, creating new patterns of soft domination on the part not only of Germany but 
also of northern/creditor states in particular whereby ‘governing at a distance’ becomes 
entrenched in EU practices. Their ‘governing at a distance’ through the Troika for countries 
under bailout programmes, or through the European Semester for all others at risk, is shaped 
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by a core belief: that there is a right way of governing irrespective of the local processes that 
this governing may affect. 
Thus, the perceived return of imperialism as reproduction of hierarchical habits in the EU 
is simply due to the assertion of the will of one or a subset of member states in ways that 
preempt democratic contestation in the political arena of another. The ability to govern at a 
distance emanates from a conviction in the creditor-EU of superior economic understandings 
and technical acumen. But this in turn would not be possible without a decision-making 
architecture that allows for monolithic choice corresponding to the preferences of parties that 
do not bare the consequences of these choices. The question is not whether member states 
collectively and the Commission concurrently in writing their blueprint are legitimately 
entitled to suggest and design some of the disciplines that will make shared membership in 
EMU sustainable. The question is rather whether in doing so, they ought to act as if there 
could be one solution, one ‘right approach’ to macro-economic policy. Institutionalised 
imperialism becomes possible when legitimized by the technocratic (ordoliberal) belief that 
economic policy can legitimately be subtracted from politics and the collective resolution of 
conflict in the democratic sphere where various forces interact.  
Some may object that IMF-type conditionality imposed on countries that cannot pay 
increases the likelihood of their doing so provides a collective good, trust in the global 
financial system, that is in everyone interest. But however one gauges the conditionality 
story, the EU was predicated on doing away specific reciprocity or measures targeting 
specific member countries in favour of disciplines applied to all and agreed in common. The 
problem with the EU today is once removed. Namely, it is that this conditionality logic with 
its neo-imperial undertones of governing at a distance has captured EU institutions 
themselves, thus conflating two hitherto separate logics, namely that of conditionality and 
that of polity-building (Nicolaidis and Watson 2014). Arguably, governing at a distance 
might be legitimate in temporary states of exception created by unsustainable sovereign debt. 
But the merger in question has sought to make permanent some elements of conditionality 
that are highly intrusive, and were forged in the heat of the moment. Hard cases make bad 
law, unless great care is taken; and the stress of crisis resolution is not an easy setting in 
which to shape a new permanent architecture for EMU that does not impose a single 
country’s will. Conditionality implies an intrusiveness – and fosters a divisiveness – that do 
not belong in the operating process of a post-imperial European polity over the long run: to 
confuse these short- and long-run disciplines, embedding conditionality mechanisms as part 
of EMU governance in normal times, is a kind of structural merger fraught with political 
risks.  
This story is not only one about the standards that pertain to shared governance in 
Europe. It relates in fact to a more fundamental dimension that resides in the perceptions, 
frustrations and fears of European publics.  To pick only one theatre, it may not have been 
surprising to have witnessed the many variations on accusations of German neo-imperialism 
(sic) in the Greek media (Nicolaidis et al. 2014). More troubling is the way in which the 
discourse has capitalized on the Greek collective memory of the Second World War, using 
images that the Greeks were already socialized with to compare Germany’s current ‘peculiar, 
economic hegemony’8 with the traumatic wartime Nazi Occupation. The Greek posture at 
least in some quarters has been squarely framed as one of resistance against foreign 
domination, urging Germany, to ‘respect those who sacrificed themselves for the liberation of 
Germany and humanity from the Nazi yoke.’9 A typical headline spoke of a ‘suffocating 
euro-tutelage,’ declaring ‘for the first time, the Commission and the ECB implement a model 
of perpetual co-government in a member state.’10 Whatever the merit of these assertions, the 
question at the heart of Europe’s future today is whether such practices and the sentiments 
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they give rise to will become entrenched throughout all of debtor-Europe or whether the EU 
will be able to encourage truly democratically sustainable reforms. 
It is indeed fascinating that this question be asked at the very historical moment when 
global power shifts and the obvious albeit relative ‘provincialisation’ of the EU in the 
international system that this entails is putting enormous pressure on the member states 
individually and collectively to compete politically and economically in order to retain a 
place in the global pecking order. At a time when the German government appears, quite 
regally, to be ignoring accusations of neo-imperial governing at a distance within Europe, the 
implication is that creditor hegemony and/or hubris is what it takes if Europeans do not want, 
one day, to be governed at a distance by the likes of China.  
 
What is to be done? The Decentering Agenda 	  
Elsewhere, we have argued that in order to respond to the pragmatic challenges as well as 
anxieties engendered by the rise of the ‘Rest’ it is necessary for the EU and its members to 
‘decenter’ habits of thinking and behaving that are post-imperial in the sense of reproduction: 
namely, attitudes emanating from the nineteenth-century era of European global hegemony 
which continue to situate Europe at the centre of the world’s affairs and at the top of its 
hierarchy. This lingering post-imperial imagination, we contend, compromises EU 
engagement of the formerly dominated world, especially in its relations with rising actors on 
an increasingly multipolar global stage. For such players, the memory of European military 
and economic dominance and cultural hubris remains aggravating – invoked to potent 
populist effect in tropes like China’s ‘hundred years of humiliation’ or Iran’s exhortation 
against ‘Westoxification’ (Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis 2013). The hostilities, suspicions, and 
mutual recriminations that this engenders - evident in hawkish policies and the soaring of 
xenophobia in EU countries - in turn, impedes Europeans’ ability to achieve a sense of the 
post-imperial as transcendence.  
To overcome this, we argue for a three-step rubric for ‘decentring’ Europe’s international 
relations and the analytical apparatus we use in its assessment. The three logics at play have 
both a sequential and a parallel structure such that each emanates from the former, while all 
three also can be pursued simultaneously. The first and best-known move as popularized by 
Chakrabarty is to seek to provincialize Europe. At one level, this entails questioning received 
wisdom about for instance, the uni-directional radiation of civilization on one hand and 
enlightened modernity on the other to less elevated corners of the world.11 At another level, it 
requires recognizing the contribution of others to the flourishing of Europe since at least the 
early modern era, the legacy of which continues to tangibly empower the EU, its members, 
and its citizens, and materially disadvantage those who have inherited societies, polities, 
economies, and ecologies brutalized by European colonialism.12 
As a second step toward decentering is engagement. This means striving to see the world 
as it looks to others. A seemingly straightforward task, in practice engaging others’ priorities 
is always tricky. This is because the questions one asks and the interpretations one brings to 
bear to the answers one receives are always intertwined with one’s own priorities and 
interests. Thus, while it is a natural starting point to engage by asking what others think of 
Europe and the EU, one must also be prepared to accept that Europe may figure rather 
negatively, if at all.  
On these grounds, the third step in the decentering agenda is to work toward 
reconstruction. This refers to the need to infuse and invigorate EU policy engagement with 
knowledge and sensibilities that emanate from extra-European perspectives – as well as those 
voices of vulnerable groups, often second- or third-generation migrants, within the EU. This 
more inclusive framework is a functional imperative if one is to retain relevance in a non-
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European world pecking order, and a step toward achieving in normative terms the illustrious 
state that the likes of Solana and Baroso have long evoked as an aspirational ideal, namely 
alignment of the outside and the inside – what we see as the transcendence rather than the 
reproduction of Europe’s ‘post-imperial’ condition. To be sure, this does not mean 
uncritically taking on board all practices and positions put forth by extra- or new-European 
interlocutors, but rather modulating the EU’s tone and prescriptions toward more fruitful 
collaborative outcomes.  	  
A Tale of Two Civilizations? Turkey as Europe’s Post-imperial Testing Ground 	  
The urgency of decentring is attested to by the bungling of Turkey’s EU candidacy, arguably 
the case par excellence of the post-imperial condition as-reproduction trumping – at least for 
the time being - the post-imperial condition as-transcendence. When Ankara’s formal 
candidacy to the Union was declared in 1999, however, this did not seem a foregone 
conclusion (Fisher Onar 2009 and 2015). On the contrary, Turkey’s membership trajectory 
was widely seen as a litmus test for the inclusionary capacity of the EU project on equality 
grounds. Would it spur the Union to evolve in a cosmopolitan post-national direction 
reconciled not only to post-Christian secular difference, but also to Muslim difference 
however secularized? In other words, would the standards of civilisation mind-set – what on 
the Turkish side was referred to half facetiously as the ‘Capitulations syndrome,’ referring to 
nineteenth century quasi-imperial usurpation of aspects of Ottoman sovereignty - be truly 
overcome? Many, especially within the EU’s liberal and left-leaning political elite and 
intelligentsia, committed to and mobilized toward substantiating this aspiration. Negotiations 
toward opening accession negotiations and concomitant reforms in Turkey were embarked 
upon in apparent good faith along with a plethora of official and civil society exchanges. 
Budgets were allocated, institutions were established, laws were passed, relationships were 
forged and, for all appearances, Turkey underwent an EU-oriented transformation. But if this 
was congruent with a triumphal sense in the early 2000s that the EU was at the threshold of 
achieving its manifest destiny as an agent of post-imperial transcendence, in practice, 
relations became increasingly strained.  
Resistance was discernible from the start in the reservations expressed by prominent 
Christian Democrats who nursed civilizational anxieties about Turkey’s prospective 
membership. It was amplified by the 9/11 attacks and the new zeitgeist they ushered in along 
with centre-right governments in France and Germany whose leadership courted to some 
extent the far right that rose to prominence in this period in both national and EU 
parliamentary politics. Fuelled by the atrocities committed by Islamist extremists in London, 
Madrid, and Amsterdam, the far right saw Turkish accession as tantamount to handing over 
the keys of (post-) Christian Europe to an ineluctably expansive and barbaric Islamist bloc, 
lambasting, moreover, the EU-level accession process as just one more instance of anti-
demoicratic excess on the part of culturally deracinated EU political elites.  
In time, if not necessarily as colourfully as in its far-right articulation, the view of Europe 
as a geocultural bloc prevailed, the ‘post-imperial’ condition as reproduction of exclusionary 
hierarchies by which we can characterise much European engagement of countries like 
Turkey or Egypt and the perceived impossibility of their meaningful integration with the 
West. To be sure, not all of Europe’s geocultural ‘Others’ are Muslim: Russia and the United 
States also have served this role at various junctures (Neumann 1999; Morozov and Rumelili 
2013). Nor are all Muslims perceived through the same prism. Muslim minority communities 
in European societies, for example, may be read through a somewhat less securitized optic 
than, for example, states and societies in Muslim-majority countries, and certainly more than 
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Islamist-led governments of Muslim-majority states. Proximity, size, and level of 
development also matter. Hence, Albania is envisaged as – eventually – internalisable, while 
the mantra beloved of those sceptical of Turkey’s EU trajectory has long been that the 
country was ‘too large, too poor, and too Muslim’ for inclusion. The appeal of the refrain 
(despite Turkey’s rapid economic development in the interim) is suggestive of the interplay 
between the post-imperial and Western conditions, in that Turkey is deemed too alien to even 
be ‘governed from afar.’ That Turkey’s detractors in Europe would rather forfeit enduring 
influence over and potentially alienate an important ally than work through the existential 
anxieties that the country’s candidacy evokes suggests that the post-imperial vis-à-vis 
Europe’s own neighbourhood is at some operative level bound up in the memory not only of 
empire as the overseas colonial projects of the 16th-19th centuries, but also earlier Holy 
Roman incarnations of European imperium.  
The Turkish case also speaks to the fallout for European foreign policy of this mixed bag 
imperial heritage. For the opening and then de facto if not formal closing of the window of 
accession, accompanied and sometimes set off a series of developments in Turkey, from 
partial democratization in the mid-2000s driven by a party with political Islamist roots, to the 
capture of the state by that same party by the end of the decade (Oktem 2011). As the 
prospect of EU accession dimmed, and outreach to Turkey’s own post-imperial 
neighbourhood - the Ottoman successor states of the Balkans and Middle East - proved 
fruitful, Ankara began to position itself as a multi-regional actor (Oktem, Kadıoğlu, Karli 
2012). Increasingly, this entailed evocation of civilizational rationales wholly congruent with 
the tale of Turkey as Europe’s Other being articulated within the EU but inversed, casting 
Turkey as the authentic and benign hegemon the region had been waiting for to rescue its 
denizens from European double-standards and exploitation. While this claim has proved 
more aspirational than practicable in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions and the 
uncertainties they have unleashed, it does testify to the unintended consequences of failure to 
confront the tension between Europe’s post-imperialism and Turkey’s ‘western condition’ or 
the unavoidable nature of its western trope (Akkoyunlu et al. 2013). By not confronting its 
post-imperial condition in enlargement policy, and not withstanding the limits of its influence 
over a government with increasing authoritarian tendency, the EU has failed to enlist a  
crucial partner at a time of great flux in their shared neighbourhood.  
 
Neighbourhood as the Limes of Empire: For a Right not to Choose? 	  
If relations with Turkey have soured for the time being, the EU’s post-colonial credentials 
could perhaps best be tested in what it has come to call its eastern neighbourhood, where 
countries that are not candidates for accession belong to a shared neighbourhood between 
Russia and the EU. Perhaps more accurately, these countries now constitute not a shared but 
a contested neighbourhood in the full senses of the term, a grey zone made up by the limes 
(the outer limits of the empire as they were called by the Romans) between two powers with 
very different relations to their colonial legacies. Whatever their contradictory aspirations, 
this is a structural fact not a Russian ploy: countries in the contested neighbourhood are 
culturally, ethnically and ideologically in between. Indeed while each in different ways, these 
countries are all divided between a ‘pro-EU’ (and not just western) side, which hankers after 
the kind of rise in prosperity witnessed in Poland (Knaus, 2014), and the eastern pro-Russia 
side, often suspicious of what they see as European values as well as promises. Accordingly, 
countries like Azerbaijan, Byelorussia or Armenia resist the EU’s eastern partnership, 
seemingly perceiving it as an instance of post-imperial reproduction.  
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Should the EU and Russia confront each other in this region as classic imperial powers 
each vying to keep or expand its respective sphere of influence? The latest crisis in Ukraine is 
but one expression of this broader question due to a great extent to the combination between 
two gaps: the gap between the parts of the populations who want to join the EU and those 
drawn to Russia (and all those in between); and the gap between the aspiration of the former 
and the EU’s propensity to deliver on these aspirations. As Borosz’s account in this volume 
reminds us, Ukraine’s membership in the European Union is off the table for the foreseeable 
future – but this has not kept the country from being torn apart. 
We believe that a truly post-imperial approach for the EU needs to start by rejecting the 
old spheres of influence approach – something the EU has proclaimed it was doing all along 
while often acting as if it didn’t. Is it enough to claim or even clumsily practice a 
‘transformative approach’ in the region, committed to exporting all good things from 
democracy to rational economic governance and the rule of law that underpins it all, while 
ignoring both the colonial underpinnings of the approach and the geo-political context of 
such (desirable) transformation? As argued by Elena Korosteleva as well as contributors in 
this volume, the neighborhood policy may have had the right intentions but the means by 
which it has been conducted in the last decade have been overwhelmingly Eurocentric and 
paternalistic (Korosteleva 2015).13 The EU’s approach has often overlooked the deeply 
entrenched cleavages in most of these countries and assumed that an external power could 
simply empower pro-western parties or certain actors within this camp without destabilizing 
effects.  Pragmatically, the EU needs to truly shape a new and decentered approach to 
relations on its eastern front including by choosing instruments that empower actors for 
change who are most capable of mediating conflicts, from societal to military.  
On the geopolitical front, Russia must be confronted in its claim that it alone respects the 
diverse make up of its former satellites. One way for the  EU to do so is to visibly uphold a a 
principle akin to a right not to choose for countries in the region. By this we mean not just a 
de facto right –as help by any sovereign country - but a proclaimed policy on the part of the 
EU, pro-actively pursued with all concerned. Such a right would likely be perceived as a 
stabilising factor and serve the unity of Europe’s divided neighbours. 
Is such a right akin to a general call for neutrality in the contested neighbourhood? No. 
But it would be reminiscent of the third word philosophy of non-alignment promulgated in 
the heydays of decolonisation. As a post-imperial move, it would mean giving full agency to 
middle states so that they themselves determine the localised order which affects them. By 
explicitly maximising their room for manoeuvre between their intrusive imperial neighbours, 
such a right not to choose would turn them from objects of hegemony to the shapers of a 
space within a dual hegemony with and overlapping realms. To be sure, competition between 
the two hegemons would not necessarily relent but these in-between states would be put in a 
position to design schemes for mutual accommodation rather than be forced to balance 
against either side. 
Specifically, a right not to choose implies for the EU to abandon the enlargement model 
in dealing with its neighbours – at least while the prospect of enlargement is inexistent-  a 
model that systematically connects access and convergence, rewarding the latter through 
access to market, visas and eventually membership. This is an approach  based on a 
concentric circle vision of ‘more or less members’ with Brussels at its centre.  
Perhaps counter-intuitively, a right not to choose would involve taking the full political 
import of trade negotiations, which appear as technical and are led by technical experts. 
Apparently, in discussions on the trade agreement with Ukraine, the EU did encourage Russia 
to consider adapting its approach so that its Eurasion customs union (or a version thereof) 
would allow individual members to negotiate their own separate trade deals. But while 
technically the EU was reassuring Russia that it could handle a deep free trade agreement 
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between the EU and Ukraine, it failed to show how this was to happen or to frame it this way 
politically. Not before the spring of 2014, as the war on the eastern front was already raging, 
did EU institutions start examining seriously the possibility of amending their own approach 
in this regard. The technicality of EU trade policy and its character as trade lawyers’ domaine 
reservé – as if the ‘standards’ were somehow a uniquely rationale and a-political matter of 
governance - constitutes a serious structural weakness for the EU when accords and political 
goals are increasingly at odds. In this case, it is indeed the content of the trade deal that 
ratcheted up the Russian threat.  
This right not to choose is of course not incompatible with EU convergence and 
ultimately a right to choose their partners for these countries. Is it not better for the EU to 
frame the relationship as ‘not choosing’ and actually seeing support for reforms? To be sure, 
there will be questioning in the future as to whether the reforms that may occur in these 
countries are the product of external EU pressure under expectations of eventual accession or 
internally devised structural change with EU and other support. But a post-imperial EU still 
needs to pursue its interests as with any other ‘normal’ actor in the international system and 
remains in the business of exporting stability: be visible on the ground, cooperate on border 
control, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction as well as the creation of a common 
communication space.  If and when the countries to Europe’s east chose to converge and 
demonstrate that they are able to, their choice needs not be a choice against Russia. Indeed, 
Putin’s Russia, like that of a purportedly ‘neo-Ottoman’ Turkey alienated from its EU 
prospects, has its own vision of the post-colonial, and that is harping back to an earlier era 
(the Concert of Vienna) in which Russia is again a key player. The EU needs to convey 
strongly that it itself has embraced a new era where the big players cannot tell smaller ones 
what to do and when the security of people as well as states is paramount.  Only such a 




In this chapter, we have reflected on what we call Europe’s post-imperial condition, which 
calls for Europeans to reflect on how deeply rooted in colonial patterns was the original 
project of European integration, and on why many chose to forget this. We also need to 
recognize the different and multiple meanings of the ‘imperial past’ which prevail in 
countries in east and central Europe, southern or northern Europe as well as in former 
European former colonies who see the EU through the lens of their own postcolonial status. It 
is the confrontation between these imperial legacies and the difficulty to transcend them by 
recognizing then and now the critical role of ‘others’ within and without in the constitution of 
the EU project which forge Europe’s post-imperial condition. Our notion of the post-imperial 
as both transcendence and as reproduction, and the modalities, dangers, and promise of each 
on the internal and external playing fields, suggests that while the EU has made much formal 
and indeed existential progress toward confronting echoes of imperialism, imperial patterns 
die hard.  
Post-colonial studies used to have their object squarely located in the world of the 
‘subaltern’ along the paths opened by the likes of Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri 
Spivak and many others. Many of the symbolic and effective types of oppression which they 
unveiled and fought, still exist. But the echoes are fainter and more confusing than in their 
immediately postcolonial times. Power is more diffuse and hybridity more pervasive. Europe 
has moved on by denying, reproducing and atoning for its pasts in equal measure. We need to 
update talk of the postcolonial condition for a changing world and confront Europe’s claims 
to post-imperialism. In the end, the EU may have become an Empire in new clothes but let us 
hope this may come to be a post-imperial Empire. 
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1 For a masterful account of the modalities of (Anglo-)American imperial amnesia and memory as seen from the 
Indian Ocean, see Engseng Ho, 2004.  
2 See, for example, seminal work on this of Behr 2007 and Stivachtis, 2008. See also Nicolaidis, Sebe and Maas 
2015. 
3 In the field of international relations, the work of John Hobson (e.g. 2007; 2012) stands as perhaps the most 
cogent articulation of this ‘mutual constitution’ of Europe and its colonies and the indebtedness of the former to 
the latter.  
4 In Nicolaidis et al. 2014 we discuss the analogy between 19th century standards of civilization and today’s EU 
along two dimensions.  Agency denial or the tendency to deny agency to new members in different domains not 
only in determining the rules applicable to them but also in determining who was to have agency in the first 
place; and Hierarchy or the inequality that exists where some agents systematically have more power than 
others and are institutionally recognised to have higher worth. While we find significant variation along these 
dimensions, we conclude that there is little doubt that the SoC mindset and practices are alive and well. 
5 See, for example, Besson, 2006; Bohman 2007; Cheneval, and Schimmelfennig, 2013; Cheneval, Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2014, Nicolaïdis 2004, 2012, 2013  
6 This trend, exemplified by Sartre’s engagement of Fanon, was about recognizing that the post-imperial 
condition involved the mutually constitutive role of internal and external dynamics. As Aimé Césaire put it at 
the heyday of mid-century decolonization, imperialism had ‘worked to decivilize the colonizer, to brutalize him 
in the true sense of the world.’ (cited in Vergès, 2011). 
7 There is a subtle difference between these two classic forms and their more EU-compatible cousins (federal 
union and neo-medieval empire). 
8 Avgi 06/01/10, p. 8, ‘Schäuble Adds Insult to Injury.’ 
9 Avgi 06/01/10, pp. 8-9, ‘The German Economics Minister Appears “Provocative” and ‘Insolent.’ 
10 Avgi 10/01/10, front page. 
11 There is an expansive literature on what Blaut (1999) was among the first to call this diffusionist  tendency. 
For a recent discussion see Jan-Gorg Deutsch, 2014. 
12 For a literature review including the notable contributions of John Hobson to the IR variant of the argument 
see Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis, 2013. 






Akkoyunlu, Karabekir, Kalypso Nicolaidis, Kerem Öktem. 2012. The Western condition: Turkey, the US and 
the EU in the New Middle East. Oxford: SEESOX Book Series on Current Affairs. 
 
Bechev, Dimitar. 2014. From the Soviet bloc to the new middle age: East-central Europe’s three imperial 
moments.’ In Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.).   Echoes of empire: Identity, 
memory, and colonial legacies. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Bechev, Dimitar and Nicolaidis, Kalypso, 2010.  “From Policy to Polity: Can the EU’s special relations with its 
Neighbourhood be Decentred?” Journal of Common Market Studies, June. 
 
Behr, Hartmut. 2007. The European Union in the legacies of imperial rule? EU accession politics viewed from a 
historical comparative perspective.’ European Journal of International Relations 13(2): 239–62. 
 
Besson, Samantha. 2006. The European Union and human rights: Towards a post-national human rights 
institution? Human Rights Law Review 6(2): 323-360. 
 
Blaut, James Morris. 2012. The colonizer's model of the world: Geographical diffusionism and Eurocentric 
history. New York: Guilford. 
 
 	   15	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bohman, James. 2007. Democracy across borders. Boston: MIT Press. 
 
Bohman, James. 2008. ‘Transnational democracy and nondomination.’ In C Laborde, J Maynor (eds.), 190-216. 
Republicanism and political theory. London: Blackwell. 
 
Cheneval, Francis, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2013. The case for demoicracy in the European Union. JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 51(2): 334-350. 
 
Cheneval, Francis, Sandra Lavenex, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2014. Demoi-cracy in the European Union: 
principles, institutions, policies. Journal of European Public Policy ahead-of-print, 1-18. 
 
Davies, Norman. 1996. Europe: a history. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Deutsch, Jan-Gorg. 2014. Colonial modernities: A View from the imperial verandah, c. 1880–1960. In 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.). Echoes of empire: Identity, memory, and 
colonial legacies. London: I.B. Tauris.  
Diez, Thomas 2013. Normative power as hegemony. Cooperation and Conflict 48(2): 194-210. 
 
Fisher Onar, Nora. 2009. Echoes of a universalism Lost: Rival representations of the Ottomans in today’s 
Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies 45(2). 
 
Fisher Onar, Nora. 2015. History, memory, and historiography: Contesting Ottoman legacies in Turkey, 1923-
2012. In Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.). Echoes of empire: Identity, memory, 
and colonial legacies. London: I.B. Tauris.  
Fisher Onar, Nora, and Kalypso Nicolaidis. 2013. The decentering agenda: Europe as a post-colonial power. 
Cooperation and Conflict 48(2): 283-303. 
Halberstam, Daniel. 2009. Constitutional heterarchy: The centrality of conflict in the European Union and the 
United States. In Dunoff, Jeffery and Trachtman, Joel (eds.) Ruling the world? Constitutionalism, 
international law and global governance, 326-355. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hansen, Peo and Stefan Jonsson. 2015. Building Eurafrica: Reviving Colonialism through European Integration, 
1920–60. In Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.). Echoes of empire: Identity, 
memory, and colonial legacies. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Hansen, Peo  and Stefan Jonsson. 2013. Imperial origins of European integration and the case of Eurafrica: A 
reply to Gary Marks’ “Europe and Its Empires.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50: 1028–
1041.  
 
Ho, Enseng. 2004. Empire through diasporic eyes: A view from the other boat. Comparative Study of Society 
and History 46(2), 210-246. 
 
Hobson, John. 2007. Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? Beyond 
Westphalian towards a post-racist critical IR. Review of International Studies 33(1): 91-116. 
 
Hobson, John. 2012. The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760-2010. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Knaus, Gerald. 2014. Why they look West – Ukraine, poverty and the EU. European Stability Initiative 
Newsletter, 21 March 
 
 	   16	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Korosteleva, Elena. 2015. The EU and its eastern neighbours: Why ‘othering’ matters. In Nicolaidis, Kalypso, 
Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.). Echoes of empire: Identity, memory, and colonial legacies. 
London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Lacroix, Justine, and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. 2010. European stories: Intellectual debates on Europe in national 
contexts. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Magnette, Paul, and Kalypso Nicolaidis,. 2005. Coping with the Lilliput syndrome: large vs. small member 
states in the European Convention. European Public Law 11(1): 85-104. 
 
Marks, Gary. 2012. Europe and its empires: From Rome to the European Union. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 50: 1–20.  
 
Morozov, Viatcheslav, and Bahar Rumelili. 2012. The external constitution of European identity: Russia and 
Turkey as Europe-makers. Cooperation and Conflict 47(1): 28-48. 
Neumann, Iver B. 1999. Uses of the other: ‘The East’ in European identity formation. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso. 2013. “European Demoicracy and Its Crisis,” Journal of Common Market Studies March 
2013 Volume 51. Number 2. pp. 351–369 
 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso. 2015. Southern Barbarians? A post-colonial critic of EUniversalism. In Nicolaidis, 
Kalypso, Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.). Echoes of empire: Identity, memory, and colonial 
legacies. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso, and Rachel Kleinfeld. 2012. Rethinking Europe's ‘rule of law’ and enlargement agenda: 
The fundamental dilemma. No. 49. OECD Publishing. 
 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Claire Vergerio, Nora Onar Fisher and Juri Viehoff. 2014. From Metropolis to 
Microcosmos: Europe’s New Standards of Civilisation. Millennium. Journal of International 
Studies 42 (3) : 718-745.  
 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.). 2015. Echoes of empire: Identity, memory, and colonial 
legacies. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Öktem, Kerem. 2011. Angry Nation. Turkey since 1989. London: Zed Books. 
 
Kerem Öktem, Kadıoğlu, Ayşe, Mehmet Karlı (Eds.). 2012. Another Empire? Turkey’s new foreign policy in 
the 2000s. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. 
 
Pagden, Anthony. 2006. The Empire’s New Clothes: From empire to federation, Yesterday and today. Common 
Knowledge 12(1): 36-46. 
 
Pettitm Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Palombella, Gianluigi, and Neil Walker (eds.). 2014. Relocating the rule of law. Oxford: Hart. 
Rossi, Juan-Jose. 2015. The history, identity, crisis, and endemic submission of the American continent. In 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Sebe, Berny, and Gari Maas (eds.) Echoes of empire: Identity, memory, and 
colonial legacies. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Stivachtis, Yannis. 2008. Civilization and International Society: The Case of European Union Expansion. 
Contemporary Politics 14(1): 71–89. 
 	   17	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Weiler, Joseph. 2001. Federalism and constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg. In Nicolaïdis Kalypso and Robert 
Howse (eds.). The federal vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Zielonka, Jan. 2006. Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged European Union. Central European Review of 























































 	   18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
